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Abstract
iClass is one of the most widely used contactless smartcards
on the market. It is used extensively in access control and
payment systems all over the world. This paper studies the
built-in key diversification algorithm of iClass. We reverse
engineered this key diversification algorithm by inspecting
the update card key messages sent by an iClass reader to the
card. This algorithm uses a combination of single DES and
a proprietary key fortification function called ‘hash0’. We
show that the function hash0 is not one-way nor collision
resistant. Moreover, we give the inverse function hash0−1
that outputs a modest amount (on average 4) of candid-
ate pre-images. Finally, we show that recovering an iClass
master key is not harder than a chosen plaintext attack on
single DES. Considering that there is only one master key
in all iClass readers, this enables an attacker to clone cards
and gain access to potentially any system using iClass.
1 Introduction
Over the last few years, much attention has been paid to
the (in)security of the cryptographic mechanisms used in
contactless smartcards [NESP08, GdKGM+08, GvRVS09,
COQ09, GvRVS10].
This paper does not focus on the security of the cards
themselves but on the security of the cryptographic proto-
cols used in the embedding systems. Concretely, we study
the key diversification and the proprietary ‘key fortification’
functions of the HID iClass contactless smartcards and the
secure key loading mode of the Omnikey readers.
iClass is an ISO/IEC 15693 [ISO09] compatible contact-
less smartcard manufactured by HID Global. It was intro-
duced on the market back in 2002 as a secure replacement
of the HID Prox card which had no cryptography at all. Ac-
cording to the manufacturer more than 300 million iClass
cards have been sold. These cards are widely used in access
control to secured buildings such as The Bank of America
Merrill Lynch, the International Airport of Mexico City and
the City of Los Angeles among many others1. According to
1http://hidglobal.com/mediacenter.php?cat2=2
HID [Cum06] iClass is also deployed at the United States
Navy base of Pearl Harbor. Other applications include se-
cure user authentication such as in the naviGO system in-
cluded in Dell’s Latitude and Precision laptops; e-payment
such as in the FreedomPay and SmartCentric systems; and
billing of electric vehicle charging such as in the Liberty
PlugIns system.
HID Global is also the manufacturer of the popular Om-
nikey readers. The Omnikey 5321 reader family is a multi-
protocol contactless reader which includes iClass compat-
ibility. Starting from firmware version 5.00 these read-
ers have the so-called ‘Omnikey Secure Mode’ which is
required to update iClass card keys. This Secure Mode
provides encryption of the USB traffic complying with
ISO/IEC 24727 [ISO08] standard.
1.1 Related Work
Experience has shown that, once obscurity has been cir-
cumvented, proprietary algorithms often do not provide a
satisfactory level of security. One of the most remark-
able examples of that is the infamous case of the Mifare
Classic [NESP08, GdKGM+08, GvRVS09] used widely in
access control and transport ticketing systems. Other ex-
amples include KeeLoq [IKD+08] and Hitag2 [SNC09],
which are widely used in wireless car keys and the
A5/1 [Gol97] and DECT [LST+09] ciphers used in cell and
cordless phones.
1.2 Our contribution
The contribution of this paper is manyfold. First it describes
the reverse engineering of the built-in key diversification al-
gorithm of iClass. This key diversification algorithm con-
sists of two parts: a cipher that is used to encrypt the iden-
tity of the card; and a key fortification function, called
hash0 in HID documentation, which is intended to add ex-
tra protection to the master key. Our approach for reverse
engineering is in line with that of [GdKGM+08, LST+09,
GvRVS10] and consists of analyzing the update card key
messages sent by an iClass compatible reader while we pro-
duce small modifications on the diversified key, just before
fortification. For this it was first necessary to bypass the
encryption layer of the Omnikey Secure Mode. We reverse
engineered the Omnikey Secure Mode and wrote a library
that is capable of communicating in Omnikey Secure Mode
to any Omnikey reader. To eavesdrop the contactless inter-
face we have built a custom firmware for the Proxmark III
in order to intercept ISO/IEC 15693 [ISO09] frames. We
have released the library, firmware and an implementation
of hash0 under the GNU General Public License and they
are available at the Proxmark website2.
Last but not least, we show that the key fortification func-
tion hash0 is actually not one-way nor collision resistant
and therefore it adds little protection to the master key.
Concretely, we give the inverse function hash0−1 that on
input a 64 bit bitstring it outputs a modest amount (on aver-
age 4) of candidate pre-images. We propose an attack that
recovers a master key from an iClass reader of comparable
complexity to that of breaking single DES, thus it can be
accomplished within a few days on a RIVYERA3. This is
extremely sensitive since there is only one master key for
all iClass readers and from which all diversified card keys
can be computed.
As an alternative, it is possible to emulate a predefined
card identity and use a DES rainbow table [Hel80] based on
this identity to perform the attack. This allows an adversary
to recover the master key within minutes.
During the course of this research, Meriac and Plo¨tz
presented a powerful procedure to read out the EEPROM
of a PIC microcontroller, like the ones used in iClass read-
ers, at the 27th meeting of the Chaos Communication Con-
gress [MP10, Mer10]. This attack is possible due to a mis-
configuration of the memory access control bits of the PIC
used in early reader models, for more details on this attack
see the OpenPCD website4. Their attack on the hardware is
a viable alternative to retrieve the master key.
2 Omnikey Secure Mode
The Omnikey contactless smartcard reader has a range of
key slots where it stores cryptographic keys. These keys
are used to authenticate with an HID iClass card. After a
valid authentication the reader gains read and write access
to the memory in the card.
All recent Omnikey 5321 and 6321 contactless smartcard
readers manufactured by HID Global support encrypted
communication with the host, which is called Secure Mode.
Applications compliant with ISO/IEC 24727 [ISO08] must
provide end-to-end encryption and therefore the USB com-
munication between the application and reader needs to be
encrypted.
To activate the Secure Mode, the host application uses
a 3DES key KCUW to perform mutual authentication
2http://www.proxmark.org
3http://www.sciengines.com
4http://www.openpcd.org/HID_iClass_demystified
with the reader. According to the Omnikey developers
guide [WDS+04] this key is only known by a limited group
of developers under a non-disclosure agreement with HID
Global.
The Omnikey Secure Mode must be active in order to
perform security sensitive operations like changing the key
of a card. In order to be able to eavesdrop and modify mes-
sages between the reader and a card during a key update,
the Omnikey Secure Mode must be circumvented.
The two-factor authentication application naviGO from
HID Global provides a login procedure for Windows com-
puters using an iClass card and a PIN-code. A trial version
of this software package is freely available online5. Nav-
iGO uses the Omnikey reader for the personalization phase
where it authenticates, updates the key and writes creden-
tials to an iClass card. To perform these actions naviGO
needs to know the cryptographic key KCUW in order to use
the Secure Mode. HID Global stores the secret key in an
unprotected binary file. After extracting KCUW from the file
iCLASSCardLib.dll we gained full control over the
secured USB channel.
We have released a library called iClassified that makes it
possible to send arbitrary commands to an Omnikey reader
using the Omnikey reader in Secure Mode.
3 iClass and PicoPass
The iClass card is basically a re-branded version of the Pi-
coPass contactless smartcard which is manufactured by In-
side Secure6. The documentation of the PicoPass [Con04]
defines the configuration options, commands and memory
structure of an iClass 2KS card. Before HID Global sells
the PicoPass as an iClass card, they configure the memory,
store their cryptographic keys and blow the fuse that allows
any future changes to the configuration.
Block Content Denoted by
0 Card serial number Identifier id
1 Configuration
2 e-Purse Card challenge cC
3 Key for application 1 Debit key kdid
4 Key for application 2 Credit key kcid
5 Application issuer area
6. . . 18 Application 1 HID application aHID
19. . . n Application 2 n = 16x−1 for xKS
Figure 1: Memory layout of an iClass card
The iClass cards come in two versions 2KS and 16KS
with respectively 256 and 4096 bytes of memory. The
memory is divided into blocks of eight bytes as shown in
Figure 1. Memory blocks 0, 1, 2 and 5 are publicly access-
ible, they contain the card serial number id, configuration
5http://www.hidglobal.com/cardServices/
naviGoTrialDownloadForm.php
6http://www.insidesecure.com/eng/Products/
Secure-Solutions/PicoPass
bits, the card challenge cC and issuer information. Block 3
and 4 contain two diversified cryptographic keys which are
derived from two different HID master keys. These master
keys are referred to in the documentation as debit key kd
and credit key kc. The card only stores the diversified keys
kdid and kcid . The remaining blocks are divided into two
areas so-called applications. The size of these applications
is defined by the configuration block.
The first application of an iClass card represents the HID
application which stores the identifier, PIN code, password
and other access control information. Read and write access
to the HID application requires a valid mutual authentica-
tion using a proprietary algorithm that proves knowledge of
kdid .
The second application is user defined and secured by a
key kcid derived from kc. The default kc (but not kd) is
stored in the same binary file that contains the secret key
for the Omnikey Secure Mode. We use this key later on
Section 4.1 during the reverse engineering process.
We use our iClassified library to eavesdrop the USB
communication while the card key is updated. We ob-
serve that a default iClass master key is loaded into key
slot 32 of the reader. This key is used to derive the card
key which is used for authentication. Then, a new mas-
ter key is loaded into slot 32 and the card key is updated
with the new derived key. Figure 2 shows the eavesdropped
messages between the reader and a card during a sequence
of card key update commands. The application first up-
dates the default key kc of an genuine iClass card to ran-
dom kc′ and kc′′. Finally it sets the default key again.
The trace shows that the key update message contains as
payload the exclusive-or (XOR) of the old and new key
as mentioned in [MP10]. This can be verified computing
(kc′id ⊕ kcid)⊕ (kc′′id ⊕ kc′id) = kcid ⊕ kc′′id .
3.1 Authentication and Key Fortification
This section describes the authentication protocol between
an iClass card and reader. Furthermore, it gives an overview
of the built-in key diversification algorithm.
The authentication protocol between an iClass card and
a reader is depicted in Figure 3. First, the card sends its
identity id and a card challenge cC. This cC is called ‘e-
purse’ [Con04] and it is special in the sense that it is in-
tended to provide freshness. Apparently, the card lacks a
pseudo-random generator and therefore, after a successful
authentication, the reader should update cC to a new value
in order to provide freshness in the next authentication.
Note that this is not enforced by the card. Next, the reader
answers with a nonce nR of its choosing and an answer aR
to the challenge of the card. This answer is presumable
some sort of MAC depending on cC and nR. Finally, the
card answers with a similar message aC to achieve mutual
authentication.
iClass has a built-in key diversification algorithm. Fig-
ure 4 is extracted from the PicoPass datasheet [Con04]. It
id,cC
←−−−−−−−−−−−
nR,aR
−−−−−−−−−−−→
aC
←−−−−−−−−−−−
Figure 3: Authentication protocol
suggests that the reader encrypts the card identity (id) us-
ing single DES. Then it performs a fortification algorithm
to obtain the diversified key. The following steps verify that
the card identity is the only input to the DES algorithm:
• start with any 64 bit bitstring c, e.g., all zeros
• choose a random key k and use DES to decrypt c. This
results in a plaintext p
• choose a different key k′ and use DES to decrypt c.
This results in a plaintext p′
• run a card key update with k with a reader that receives
identity p from a card emulator. Repeat this using key
k′ and identity p′ and verify that the derived key kp is
equal to k′p′ .
Key fortification functions are non-injective functions
(many-to-one) which, in contrast with hash functions, in-
tentionally have many collisions [AL94]. The idea behind
it is that even if an adversary has access to many diversi-
fied keys, these do not univocally determine a master key.
This comes, of course, at the cost of loosing entropy in the
diversified key.
In practice, it means that even if you manage to invert
the fortification function, you will get many candidate pre-
images which in turn you need to brute force to get to the
master secret key.
Figure 4: Extracted from the PicoPass datasheet [Con04]
4 Reverse Engineering Key Fortification
This section describes the reverse engineering of the key
fortification function. The design of this function, called
h0 [Cum03] or hash0 [Cum06], is not publicly available.
Our primary goal is to learn the card key derivation which
gives complete control over the card key. In order to reach
this goal it is necessary to reverse engineer the fortification
function.
As explained in Section 3.1 the input to the key diversi-
fication is a master secret key (e.g., kc or kd) and a card
identity id. From this key, say kc, and id a ciphertext
c = DESenc(id,kc) is computed. Finally, the actual diversi-
fied key kcid is computed hash0(c) = kcid .
Origin Message Description
Reader 0c 00 73 33 Read identifier
Tag 86 1d c1 00 f7 ff 12 e0 Card serial number id
Reader 0c 01 fa 22 Read configuration
Tag 12 ff ff ff 7f 1f ff 3c iClass 2KS configuration
Reader 18 02 Authenticate with kcid
Tag fe ff ff ff ff ff ff ff Card challenge cC
Reader 05 00 00 c1 d9 7e 99 bb f4 Reader challenge (05, nR, aR)
Tag 46 3c 62 98 Response (aC)
Reader 87 04 fc b4 32 3e 6a 86 56 26 8a b5 18 cc Update kcid (8704, kc′id ⊕ kcid , 8ab518cc)
Tag ff ff ff ff ff ff ff ff Update succesful
Reader 0c 00 73 33 Read id
. . .
Reader 87 04 76 98 db 5d 01 78 0a 8f 67 25 c1 08 Update kcid (8704, kc′′id ⊕ kc′id , 6725c108). . .
Reader 87 04 8a 2c e9 63 6b fe 5c a9 e2 a5 bc 55 Update kcid (8704, kcid ⊕ kc′′id , e2a5bc55)
Figure 2: Authenticate and update keys of an iClass card
4.1 Input-Output Relations
A good first step to recover hash0 is to analyze its input-
output relations on bit level. This requires complete control
over its input c which can be achieved in a test setup by the
emulation of a card identity id knowing the master key kc.
The following steps deliver XOR differences between
two hash0 evaluations that differ only one bit in the input:
• generate a large set of random bitstrings ci ∈ {0,1}64.
• for each ci calculate idi = DESdec(ci,kc) and id ji =
DESdec(ci ⊕ 2 j,kc) for j ∈ {0, . . . ,63}.
• for each ci execute 64 key updates as follows:
– authenticate with idi
– perform a key update, the reader requests the
card identity again, now use id ji instead of idi
Keep the key kc constant during the key updates described
above. This delivers the XOR of two function evaluations
of the form hash0(ci) ⊕ hash0(ci ⊕ 2 j). We performed
this procedure for 3000 values ci with j ∈ {0, . . . ,63}. The
results are grouped by the position of the flipped bit. Then,
the AND and OR is computed of all the results in a group.
These cumulative AND and OR-masks for 64 bitflips in
3000 random bitstrings ci are presented in Figure 6 and 9.
4.2 Function Input Partitioning
Figure 6 shows that the hash0 function handles the 48 right-
most bits in smaller 6-bit pieces. These 6-bit data chunks
are defined as z0, . . . ,z7. The two bytes on the left are
defined x and y. Here x defines a permutation on the output
and the individual bits of y define whether or not a comple-
ment operation is applied on one of the 6-bit output values.
The eight output bytes are defined as k0, . . . ,k7 and consti-
tute the diversified key kcid . Similarly, the input c to the
hash0 function is constituted by c = 〈x,y,z0, . . . ,z7〉.
For the ease of reading we write x[b] to denote the b-th bit
of variable x where x[0] means the rightmost bit of x.
The structure of the masks in Figure 6 and 9 are com-
puted with x = y = 0 and z0, . . . ,z7 as random bitstrings.
The masks lead to the following observations:
• z0, . . . ,z3 affects k4, . . . ,k7.
• z4, . . . ,z7 affects k0, . . . ,k3.
• z0, . . . ,z3 and z4, . . . ,z7 generate a similar structure in
the output but are mutually independent. This suggests
that there is a subfunction that is called twice, once
with z0, . . . ,z3 and once with z4, . . . ,z7. In the context
of this paper we refer to this function as scramble.
• y[i] affects ki for i ∈ {0, . . . ,7}. The OR-mask for y in-
dicates a complement operation on the output while
the AND-mask presumes an injective function that
maps y[i] to ki[7].
• x creates a permutation. The output is scrambled after
flipping a single bit within x. The AND-mask shows
that ki[0] is exclusively affected by x for i ∈ {0, . . . ,7}.
• flipping bits in z0, . . . ,z7 does never affect the left- or
rightmost bits of k0, . . . ,k7. This is inferred from the
occurrences of the 0x7e value in the OR-mask which
is 01111110 in binary.
x y
k1 k2 k3 k7k4 k6k5k0
z 0z 1z 2z 3z 4z 5z 6z 7
x y z 0 z 1 z 2 z 3 z 4 z 5 z 6 z 7
{ { { { { { { {
Figure 5: Partitioned Function Input for x = 0
The above observations suggest that the problem of func-
tion recovery can be split into parts. Figure 5 summarizes
how different parts of the input affect specific parts of the
output when x is kept zero. Note that the last observation
shows that the subfunction scramble operates on four 6-bit
input values and computes four 6-bit output values. These
output values constitute the middle 6 bits of output bytes ki,
see Figure 5. Furthermore, it is observed that the ordering
of the 6-bit output values and the leftmost bit of the output
bytes are determined by x. Each bit of y is simply copied
into the rightmost bit of each output byte.
Summarizing, the hash0 function can be split into three
different parts. The first part is the subfunction scramble
which is called twice, once with input z0, . . . ,z3 and once
with input z4, . . . ,z7. The second part computes a bitwise
complement operation based on the complement byte y and
the last part applies a permutation that is defined by the per-
mute byte x. The following sections discuss these different
parts of the hash0 function. Finally, Section 4.6 defines the
complete function.
bit OR-mask AND-mask
⊕→ k0k1k2k3k4k5k6k7 k0k1k2k3k4k5k6k7
z7


0 7e7e7e7e00000000 0400000000000000
1 7e7e7e7e00000000 0400000000000000
2 7a7e7e7e00000000 0800000000000000
3 727e7e7e00000000 1000000000000000
4 627e7e7e00000000 2000000000000000
5 427e7e7e00000000 4000000000000000
z6


6 007e7e7e00000000 0000000000000000
. . . . . .
11 007e7e7e00000000 0000000000000000
z5


12 00007e7e00000000 0000000000000000
. . . . . .
17 00007e7e00000000 0000000000000000
z4


18 0000007e00000000 0000000000000000
. . . . . .
23 0000007e00000000 0000000000000000
z3


24 00000000027e7e7e 0000000002000000
25 00000000047e7e7e 0000000004000000
26 00000000087e7e7e 0000000008000000
27 00000000107e7e7e 0000000010000000
28 00000000207e7e7e 0000000020000000
29 00000000407e7e7e 0000000040000000
z2


30 00000000007e7e7e 0000000000000000
. . . . . .
35 00000000007e7e7e 0000000000000000
z1


36 0000000000007e7e 0000000000000000
. . . . . .
41 0000000000007e7e 0000000000000000
z0


42 000000000000007e 0000000000000000
. . . . . .
47 000000000000007e 0000000000000000
Figure 6: OR and AND-mask for bitflip 0-47
4.3 Subfunction scramble
This section describes the reverse engineering of the sub-
function scramble which operates on four 6-bit input val-
ues z0, . . . ,z3. In order to recover this part of the function
we keep x= y= 0 while z0, . . . ,z7 are randomly chosen. For
the scramble subfunction only bitflips at positions 0 to 47
matter (see Figure 6). It makes sense to start with the recov-
ery of either k0 or k4 as they both depend on a single input
zi. Notice that k4 is just z3 shifted one bit to the left since we
keep x = y = 0. However, k0 seems less predictable. The
XOR between two outputs ki ⊕ k′i of two function calls is
defined as k⊕i . Furthermore, be aware that the subfunction
scramble only affects bits ki[1], . . . ,ki[6] (See Fig 5). To put
it differently, the output is always shifted one bit to the left
and therefore this shift can be omitted from the analysis.
In order to find a relation between input values z7 and
output values k⊕0 a selection of all observed values k
⊕
0 is
made. Figure 7 shows a relation between z7 and k⊕0 and
shows which bits of z7 are fixed for a certain output value
k⊕0 . Bits that do not matter are marked with a dot and the
bitflip is marked f. The two inputs are z7 where f = 0 and
z′7 where f = 1.
z7/z
′
7 k
⊕
0 z7/z
′
7 k
⊕
0
....0f 06 ....f0 04
...01f 0e ...0f1 0c
..011f 1e ..01f1 1c
.0111f 3e .011f1 3c
11111f 7c 0111f1 7c
01111f 7e 1111f1 7e
Figure 7: Input-output relations for k⊕0
The relation is represented for every two inputs z7 and z′7
as k⊕0[1..6] = (z7 mod 63)+1⊕ (z
′
7 mod 63)+1 which gives
confidence that k0[1..6] = (z7 mod 63)+ 1. The next step is
to find k1[1..6] which is dependent on two input input values,
namely z6 and z7. Again, an overview of all input-output
relations (Figure 8) is constructed. The first part where
k⊕1 ∈ {02,0c,52,6c, . . .} is the result of flipping z6[0] and
the second part where k⊕1 ∈ {0c,1c,3c, . . . ,4e,64, . . .} is
the result of flipping z6[1].
The observations for flipping z6[0] and z6[1] show that in
97 % of the cases input z6 and z7 are independent. 3 % of the
bitflips in z6 make z6 +1 equal to z7 or destroy this equality
instead.
% z6/z′6 z7 k
⊕
1
0.97 .....f ...... 02


bitflip z6[0]0.03


00010f 000101 0c
10011f 101000 52
11001f 110100 6c
.....f ...... . . .
0.97


....f. ...... 0c


bitflip z6[1]
...1f. ...... 1c
.011f. ...... 3c
1111f. ...... 78
0111f. ...... 7c
0.03


0010f0 001001 1a
0110f0 011001 3a
1001f0 100111 4e
1100f1 110100 64
....f. ...... . . .
Figure 8: Input-output relations for k⊕1
When z6[1] is flipped more output variations in k⊕1 are
observed. Example for k⊕1 = 0x3c:
z6 = 001101, z6 +2 = .001111.
z′6 = 001111, z
′
6 +2 = .010001. ⊕
00111100= 0x3c
The result k⊕1 = 78 comes from a modulo operation. Here
input z6 is taken modulo 62, which is 111110 in binary.
Example for k⊕1 = 0x78:
z6 = 111100, (z6 mod 62)+2 = .111110.
z′6 = 111110, (z′6 mod 62)+2 = .000010. ⊕
01111000= 0x78
Then, 3 % of the output variations invoked by bitflips in
z6[1] describe a relation z6 + 1 = z7. The corresponding k⊕1
is obtained by taking k1[1..6]= 1 when the relation holds and
k1[1..6] = (z6 mod 62)+ 2 when it does not hold. Example
for k⊕1 = 0x4e:
z6 = 100100, (z6 mod 62)+2 = .100110.
z′6 = 100110, ((z′6 mod 62)+1 = n7) = .000001. ⊕
01001110= 0x4e
Eventually, the function for k1[1..6] is:
k1[1..6]=
{
1, (z6 mod 62)+ 1 = (z7 mod 63);
(z6 mod 62)+ 2, otherwise.
The remaining k2[1..6] and k3[1..6] can be found in a sim-
ilar way by flipping bits in the input and closely looking
at the input-output relations. Also, it helps to look for re-
lated modulo operations on z5 and z4. We give k2[1..6] to
give some idea of the evolving structure of the function:
k2[1..6]=


2, (z5 mod 61)+ 1 = (z6 mod 62);
∧ (z7 mod 63) 6= 0;
1, (z5 mod 61)+ 1 = (z6 mod 62)
∧ (z7 mod 63) = 0;
1, (z5 mod 61)+ 2 = (z7 mod 63);
(z5 mod 61)+ 3, otherwise.
After the recovery of the first block z4, . . . ,z7 it is relatively
easy to find the subfunction for z0, . . . ,z3. The modulos
and additions differ but the structure of the function is com-
pletely the same. For this reason it is possible to write it as a
subfunction scramble that is called twice, once for z0, . . . ,z3
and once for z4, . . . ,z7. The final subfunction scramble is
given by Definition 4.1.
4.4 Complement Byte
The complement byte y performs a complement operation
on the output of the function. Figure 9 shows that flipping
a bit y[i] means that bit ki[7] is flipped for i ∈ {0, . . . ,7}. No-
tice that no other input bit influences any ki[7]. Furthermore,
ki[1], . . . ,ki[6] are flipped but be aware that these bits might
come from any other z j due to the permute byte x. Finally,
every ki[0] is not affected. It is important to observe that for
k4, . . . ,k7 the OR and AND-mask agree that the left 7 bits
are always flipped while for k0, . . . ,k3 this is not true. To be
precise, the bits k0[1],k1[1],k2[1] and k3[1] are never flipped.
This is because the 6-bit output value z j that constitutes out-
put byte ki is decremented by one if j ≤ 3 except when
bit OR-mask AND-mask
⊕→ k0k1k2k3k4k5k6k7 k0k1k2k3k4k5k6k7
y


48 fc00000000000000 8000000000000000
49 00fc000000000000 0080000000000000
50 0000fc0000000000 0000800000000000
51 000000fc00000000 0000008000000000
52 00000000fe000000 00000000fe000000
53 0000000000fe0000 0000000000fe0000
54 000000000000fe00 000000000000fe00
55 00000000000000fe 00000000000000fe
x


56 7f7f7f7e7e7f7f7f 0101010000010101
57 00007f7e7f000000 0000010001000000
58 7f7e7e7e7f000000 0100000001000000
59 7f7e7e7e7e7f0000 0100000000010000
60 00007f7e7e7e7f00 0000010000000100
61 7f7e7f7f7f7f7f00 0100010101010100
62 7f7e7f7e7e7f7f00 0100010000010100
63 7f7e7f7e7f7e7f00 0100010001000100
Figure 9: OR and AND-mask for bitflip 48-63
pi = [
01234567, 35670124, 01342567, 15670234, 12340567,
34670125, 01352467, 14670235, 12350467, 23670145,
02451367, 12670345, 12450367, 02671345, 23450167,
34570126, 01362457, 14570236, 12360457, 23570146,
02461357, 03571246, 03461257, 02571346, 23460157,
23470156, 02561347, 03471256, 03561247, 02471356,
23560147, 12370456, 14560237, 01372456, 34560127,
45670123, 01243567, 25670134, 02341567, 05671234,
01253467, 24670135, 02351467, 04671235, 01452367,
13670245, 03451267, 03671245, 13450267, 01672345,
01263457, 24570136, 02361457, 04571236, 01462357,
13570246, 12460357, 12570346, 13460257, 01572346,
01562347, 13470256, 12560347, 12470356, 13560247,
01472356, 04561237, 02371456, 24560137, 01273456 ]
Figure 10: Permutation pi
y[i] = 0. Example for k⊕0 = 0xfc:
z j = 101101, where j ≤ 3
y0 = 0, k0 = y0 · z j · t = 0101101t
y′0 = 1, k′0 = y′0 · z j −1 · t = 1010011t ⊕
11111100= 0xfc
4.5 Permute Byte
Finally, byte x applies a permutation. Iterating over x while
keeping y and z0, . . . ,z7 constant shows that x is taken mod-
ulo 70 since the same output is repeated again for every 70
consecutive inputs. The cumulative bitmasks of the output
differences, shown in Figure 9, do not give direct inform-
ation about this permutation but do make clear that ki[0] is
affected. Experiments show that x is an injective mapping
on ki[0] for i = 0, . . . ,7. This means that it is possible to
learn x from ki[0]. Furthermore, the permutation is inde-
pendent of y and zi. This means that a table of mappings
can be constructed which takes x as index and has particu-
lar mappings as its entries. The mappings are presented in
Figure 10. To illustrate, pi0 = 01234567 means that there is
no mixing at all and pi2 = 01342567 means that k0 stays at
position 0 while k4 is moved to position 2. To isolate one
particular mapping we write pix(i) which returns the target
position of 6-bit output value zˆi.
4.6 Diversification and Fortification
This section describes the recovered key diversification and
fortification procedure. Definition 4.2 gives the definition
of the function hash0. It uses a subfunction scramble which
is defined by Definition 4.1. First, the key diversification
procedure where a diversified key kcid is computed from a
card identity id and master key kc is as follows:
kcid = hash0(DESenc(id,kc))
Here the DES encryption of id with master key kc out-
puts a cryptogram c of 64 bits. These 64 bits are divided as
c = 〈x,y,z0, . . . ,z7〉 ∈ F82×F
8
2× (F
6
2)
8 and used as input to
the hash0 function. Finally, the output of the hash0 function
is kcid = 〈k0, . . . ,k7〉 ∈ (F82)8.
The function hash0 first computes x′ = x mod 70 which
results in 70 possible permutations (See Fig. 10). Then for
all zi the modulus and additions are computed before calling
the subfunction scramble.
Then, the subfunction scramble is called twice, first on
input z′0, . . . ,z′3 and then on input z′4, . . . ,z′7. The definition
of the function scramble is as follows.
Definition 4.1. Let the function scramble : (F62)4 → (F62)4
be defined as
scramble(z0 . . . z3) = sc(0,1,z0 . . .z3)
where sc : N×N× (F62)4 → (F62)4 is defined as
sc(2,4,z0 . . . z3) = z0 . . . z3
sc(i,4,z0 . . . z3) = sc(i+ 1, i+ 2,z0 . . . z3)
sc(i, j,z0 . . . z3) ={
sc(i, j+ 1,z0..zi ← (3− j)..z3), zi = z j;
sc(i, j+ 1,z0 . . . z3), otherwise.
After this a permutation is applied to the output bytes. The
definition of hash0 is as follows.
Definition 4.2. Let the function hash0 : F82×F82× (F62)8 →
(F82)
8 be defined as
hash0(x,y,z0 . . . z7) = k0 . . .k7
where
x′ = x mod 70
z′i = (zi mod 61+ i)+ 3− i i = 0 . . .3
z′i = (zi mod 56+ i)+ 7− i i = 4 . . .7
zˆ0 . . . zˆ3 = scramble(z′0 . . . z′3)
z˙4 . . . z˙7 = scramble(z′4 . . . z′7)
zˆi = z˙i + y[pix′(7−i)] i = 4 . . .7
kpix′ (i) =
{
y[pix′ (i)] · zˆ7−i · (i > 3), y[pix′ (i)] = 0;
y[pix′ (i)] · zˆ7−i · (i > 3), otherwise.
i = 0 . . .7
5 Weaknesses
This section describes weaknesses in the design of the Om-
nikey Secure Mode and on the iClass built-in key diversi-
fication and fortification algorithms. These weaknesses will
be later exploited in Section 6.
5.1 Omnikey Secure Mode
Even though encrypting the communication over USB is
in principle a good practice, the way it is implemented in
the Omnikey Secure Mode adds very little security. The
shared key kCUW is the same for all Omnikey readers and
it is included in software that is publicly available online.
This only gives a false feeling of added security.
5.2 Weak key diversification algorithm
iClass uses single DES encryption for key diversification.
This provides very weak protection of the master key. This
is a critical weakness, especially considering that there is
only one master key for the HID application for all iClass
cards.
The manufacturer seems to be aware of this weakness
and tries to tackle the problem by adding the key fortifica-
tion function.
This comes at the price of loosing entropy on the diver-
sified card keys. After the DES computation the diversified
64-bit card key have at most 56 bit of entropy. Then, this
key is put through the fortification function where it looses
another 2.2 bits of entropy. In the next section, we explain
where these 2.2 bits come from and discuss the security
properties of the fortification function.
5.3 Weak key fortification
This section clarifies why the key fortification is not
strengthening the diversified key kcid . First, note that
only the modulo operations in hash0 on x ( 25670 ) and
z0, . . . ,z2,z4, . . . ,z7 are responsible for the collisions in the
output. The expected number of pre-images for an output
of hash0 is given by:
256
70 ×
64
60 ×
63
∏
n=61
(
64
n
)2
≈ 4.72
These modulo operations make inverting the function
straightforward. For every pre-image one needs to determ-
ine if there exists another value within the input domain that
leads to the same output when the modulus is taken. Note
that each input value zi may have a second pre-image that
maps to the same output value. Furthermore, every permute
byte x has at least two other values that map to the same out-
put value and in some cases there is even a third one. This
means that the minimal number of pre-images is three. The
probability p that for a given random input c there are only
two other pre-images is:
p =
24
70 ×
60
64 ×
63
∏
n=61
( n
64
)2
≈ 0.27
This means that hash0 does not add that much of addi-
tional protection. For example, imagine an attacker who
can learn the output kcid of hash0(DESenc(id,kc)) for ar-
bitrary values id. Then, the probability p′ for an attacker
to obtain an output kcid which has only three pre-images
is p′ = 1− (1− p)n, where n is the number of function
calls using random identities id. For n = 15 this probab-
ility p′ > 0.99.
5.4 Inverting hash0
It is relatively easy to compute the inverse of the function
hash0. Let us first compute the inverse of the function
scramble. Observe that the function scramble−1 is defined
just as scramble except for one case where the condition
and assignment are swapped. Concretely,
Definition 5.1. Let the function scramble−1 : (F62)4 →
(F62)
4 be defined just as scramble(z0 . . . z3) except for the
following case where
sc−1(i, j,z0 . . . z3) ={
sc−1(i, j+ 1,z0..zi ← z j..z3), zi = 3− j;
sc−1(i, j+ 1,z0 . . .z3), otherwise.
Next, we define the function hash0−1, the inverse of
hash0. This function outputs a set C of candidate pre-
images. These pre-images output the same key k when ap-
plying hash0. The definition of hash0−1 is as follows.
Definition 5.2. Let the function hash0−1 : (F82)8 → {F82×
F
8
2× (F
6
2)
8} be defined as
hash0−1(k0 . . .k7) = C
where
C ={x|x≡ x′ mod 70}×{y}×
{z0|z0 ≡ z˜0 mod 61}×{z1|z1 ≡ z˜1 mod 62}×
{z2|z2 ≡ z˜2 mod 63}×{z3|z3 ≡ z˜3 mod 64}×
{z4|z4 ≡ z˜4 mod 60}×{z5|z5 ≡ z˜5 mod 61}×
{z6|z6 ≡ z˜6 mod 62}×{z7|z7 ≡ z˜7 mod 63}
x′ is the unique element in F82 s.t. (pix′(i)> 3)⇔ (ki[7] = 1),
for i = 0 . . .7.
y[i] = kpix′ (i)[0] i = 0 . . .7
z˜i = z
′
i− (3− (i mod 4)) i = 0 . . .7
z′0 . . .z
′
3 = scramble−1(zˆ0 . . . zˆ3)
z′4 . . .z
′
7 = scramble−1(z˙4 . . . z˙7)
z˙[i] = zˆ[i]− y[pix′ (7−i)] i = 4 . . .7
zˆi =
{
kpix′ (7−i)[1...6], y[pix′ (7−i)] = 0;
kpix′ (7−i)[1...6], otherwise. i = 0 . . .7
6 Key recovery attack
From the weaknesses that were explained in the previous
section it can be concluded that hash0 does not signific-
antly increase the complexity of an attack on the master
key kc. In fact, the attack explained in this section requires
one brute force run on DES. For this key recovery attack
an attacker needs to control a reader and be able to issue
key update commands. This is the case, for example, in the
Omnikey Secure Mode. The attack consists of two phases:
Phase 1
• emulate a random identity id to the reader
• issue an update key command that updates from a
known user defined key kc′ to the unknown master
key kc. Now, idkc = hash0(DESenc(id,kc)) can be ob-
tained from the XOR difference.
• compute the pre-images ci of idkc.
• repeat Phase 1 until an output idkc is obtained which
has three pre-images.
Phase 2
• for every candidate key kt ∈ {0,1}56 check if
DESenc(id,kt) = ci for i ∈ {0,1,2}
• when the check above succeeds the corresponding key
kt needs to be verified against another set of id and
kcid .
We verified this attack on the two master keys kc and kd that
are stored in the Omnikey reader for the iClass application.
The first key kc was also stored in the naviGO software
and we could check the key against pre-images that were
selected as described above. Although we did not find kd
stored in software we were still able to verify it since we
could dump the EEPROM of a reader where kd was stored.
The attack above comes down to a brute force attack on
single DES. A slightly different variant is to keep the card
identity id fixed and use a DES rainbow table [Hel80] that
is constructed for a specific plaintext and runs through all
possible encryptions of this plaintext. Note that the rainbow
table needs to be pre-computed and thus a fixed plaintext is
chosen on forehand. This means that one fixed predefined
id is to be used in the attack. The number of pre-images
can no longer be controlled. In the worst case the number
of pre-images is 512.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have shown that obscurity does not provide
extra security and it can be circumvented. In fact, exper-
ience shows that instead of adding extra security it often
covers for negligent designs.
It is hard to imagine why HID decided, back in 2002, to
use single DES for key diversification considering that DES
was already broken in practice in 1997 [Fou98]. Especially
when most (if not all) HID readers are capable of comput-
ing 3DES. Another unfortunate choice was to design their
proprietary hash0 function instead of using an openly de-
signed and community reviewed hash function like SHA-1.
From a cryptographic perspective, their proprietary func-
tion hash0 fails to achieve any desirable security goal.
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